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Human rights, the rule of law, and
the construction of tradition
The Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court and Female Circumcision
(appeal no. 5257/43, 28 Dec. 1997)
Kilian Bälz
1 Few issues have generated a greater body of literature in recent years than Islam and
human rights.1Both increasing human rights awareness throughout the Arab world, and
human rights rhetoric entering international politics have fuelled the debate on whether
« Islam » is incompatible with, or at least hampers, the development of « human rights »
as defined in international conventions.2While some studies emphasize areas of conflict
between « Western »  and « Islamic »  conceptions  of  human rights  (e.g.  Mayer,  1991),
others stress the discursive character of the Arab human rights debate and underline the
diversity of opinions produced by both Islamist and secular thinkers (e.g. Müller, 1996).
The majority of studies, nevertheless, have two features in common. First, « culture » is
isolated as a prominent determinant in the development of human rights. The starting
point is the concept of human rights as a product of Western civilization. Human rights
issues in Arab and Islamic societies are consequently treated as questions of « culture-
based resistance » to the « reception » of Western legal principles. Second, in examining
the alleged incompatibilities, most studies focus on Islamic legal writings dealing with the
issue from a more or less theoretical perspective, at times complemented by selected
constitutional documents.
2 This paper, in contrast, takes a different approach. Drawing on a recent Egyptian case
regarding  female  circumcision,  the  question  of  « Islam  and  human  rights »  will  be
examined in the light of judicial practice. Choosing the judicial implementation of human
rights  as  a starting  point,  moreover,  allows  one  to  reconsider  the  role  assigned  to
« culture » in this context.
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Human rights and the rule of law
3 The judicial implementation of human rights cannot be divorced from the concept of the
rule of law, the idea that the ruler is subject to the law and controlled through judicial
procedure.  In Egypt,  this concept is enshrined in Article 64 of the 1971 Constitution,
which states : « The rule of law is the basis of rule in the state (siyâdat al-qânûn asâs al-
hukm fi-l-dawla). »
4 The « supremacy of law » embodied in Article 64 of the Egyptian Constitution is based on
a  long-standing  tradition  (Brown,  1996 ;  Ziadeh,  1968).  The  origins  of  modern
administrative justice in Egypt can be traced back to the 19 th century. Moreover, the
Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court (al-mahkama al-idâriyya al-'ulyâ),  established in
1946, successfully claimed the right to constitutional review as early as 1948 (Hill, 1993 ;
'Azîza  al-Sharîf,  1990).  The  Egyptian  Supreme  Constitutional  Court  (al-mahkama  al-
dustûriyya  al-'ulyâ),  established  in  1979,  represents  a  powerful  judicial  body,  widely
respected for protecting the rule of law within a rather unfavorable political environment
(Brown, 1997 : 102-107).
5 Both  the  Egyptian  Administrative  Court  and  the  Supreme  Constitutional  Court  have
produced remarkable case laws covering a wide variety of human rights issues (al-Sharîf,
1990 ; el-Morr, 1993 ; Boyle and Sherif, 1996). In numerical terms, however, influence of
Islamic law on the judicial implementation of human rights has, in Egyptian practice,
been rather minimal ; the vast body of literature on « Islam and human rights » is not
really related to the practical significance of the issue. Nevertheless, in some instances
Islamic  law  may  come  into  play,  particularly  with  respect  to  issues  of  freedom  of
expression and religion3as well as gender equality. Another issue is female circumcision,
also known as female genital mutilation (FGM).
 
The case of female circumcision
6 Female circumcision4(khitân al-inâth)  has been at the heart of the Islam-human rights
controversy in Egypt in recent years. This custom of pre-Islamic origin, practiced in the
Nile valley in Pharaonic times, was later incorporated in the body of Islamic fiqh, and — at
least by some fuqahâ' — explicitly sanctioned in Islamic terms (cf. Berkey, 1996). It is still
widely practiced in Egypt today. A recent study holds that 97 % of all Egyptian girls are
subjected to this operation,5which, due to its severe effects on both physical and mental
health, is termed by critiques a « mutilation in the name of Allah » (Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh,
1994b)  and  considered  a  « traitement  inhumainet  dégradant »,  an  inhuman  and
degrading  treatment  (Jaillardon,  1997 :338).  Female  circumcision,  therefore,  has  been
among the core issues raised by Egyptian and international human rights organizations6.
The American broadcasting channel CNN covered the issue on the occasion of the UN
Conference on Population and Development in 1994. This, along with the death of a 14-
year-old girl while a physician was performing the operation in 1996, once more fuelled
controversy over the legitimacy of this custom, whose proponents argue is prescribed by
Islam.
7 In  July  1996,  however,  the  Egyptian  Minister  of  Health  promulgated  a  decree  (no.
261/1996) which provides :
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Art. 1. Performing the operation of female circumcision ('amaliyyat khitân al-inâth) is
forbidden both in hospitals  and public  or private clinics,  other than in cases of
illness, which, upon request of the responsible physician, must be approved by the
director of the gynaecological department of the hospital.
Art. 2.  Performing the operation (of female circumcision) by non-physicians is  a
crime which  is  subject  to  punishment  according  to  the  laws  and ordinances  in
force.
8 Through this decree, female circumcision was prohibited. Even though the 1996 decree
was not the first attempt to regulate the issue, and previous legislation was everything
but effective,7the legislative measure put female circumcision once more on the agenda of
public debate. While most human rights organizations cautiously welcomed the decree as
a step towards eradicating a cruel and humiliating custom, Islamists tended to dismiss the
decree, arguing it was contrary « to Islam and Islamic teachings. »8
9 The decree,  moreover,  was instantly attacked in the Cairo Administrative Court.  The
plaintiffs, lead by Islamist Shaykh Yûsif al-Badrî, claimed that the decree was void as it
violated, inter alia, the « principles of Islamic law » mentioned as « the major source of
legislation » in Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution.9They stated that Islamic fuqahâ' 
agreed on the  legitimacy  of  female  circumcision  and that  the  worldly  ruler  (hâkim), 
moreover,  may not impose any restrictions upon what is « allowed through a textual
provision (mubâh bil-nass) » or what is « compulsory (wâjib) or recommended (mandûb) » 
under Islamic law, as this represents « a command of the divine legislator (amran min al-
shâri), which may not be opposed. »
10 The Administrative Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on 24 June 1996.10The Minister of
Health, however, appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, which, in turn, waved
the previous judgment on 28 December 1997. The ruling of the Supreme Administrative
Court, meandering at times, develops around three key issues :
1. Are the plaintiffs entitled to the action, in other words : who has the right to
intervene in case a legislative enactment violates the precepts of the Islamic sharî'
a ?
2. To what extent is the legislature bound by the « principles of the Islamic shari'a » 
mentioned  in  Article  2  of  the  Constitution ?  In  other  words :  may  a  custom
sanctioned through reference to  Islamic  law be banned by issuing a  ministerial
decree ?
3. How does female circumcision relate to the right to bodily integrity ? In other
words : is there a legal basis which can justify the mutilation of female genitals ?
11 A closer look at legal reasoning in the judgment puts the question of « culture-based
resistance  to  rights »  in  a  somewhat  different  light.  Here,  one  can  isolate  two
complementary  tendencies.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Court  readily  allows  legislative
enactments  to  be  challenged  on  grounds  of  violating the  « principles  of  the  Islamic
sharî'a » mentioned in Article 2 of the Constitution. On the other hand, however, the Court
reserves  the  right  to  determine  the  substance  of  these  principles.  Through  judicial
review, based on « the principles of the Islamic sharî'a, » the Court establishes itself in the
end as the competent authority for the definition of « customs » recognized as « Islamic ».
 
To raise an action — the right of every Muslim ?
12 The question of who is entitled to an action has troubled Egyptian courts considerably in
recent years, particularly due to the increasing number of so called hisba actions : hisba, 
the Islamic duty to « promote good and prevent evil » developed into a legal device which
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provides third parties with a legal standing whenever « the rights of God (huqûq Allah)
 »are infringed, understood to include all matters related to « public policy or the Islamic
Umma in general. » This allowed submitting allegedly « un-islamic » behavior of whatever
kind, to judicial scrutiny (cf. Bälz, 1998). The most prominent cases based on the hisba 
principle are the « Abu Zayd case »11 and the legal battle which followed the release of
Youssef Chahine's film Al-Muhâjir12Through an amendment of both the law of personal
status and the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures in 1996, however, this kind of
popular action was abolished.13
13 When discussing the present case, the Court therefore consciously avoided any reference
to the Islamic duty to « promote good and to prevent evil, » and, moreover, explicitly
stated  that  the  present  action  did  not  represent  a  hisba  action,  but  was  based  on
established principles of Egyptian administrative law. Article 12 paragraph 1 of Law no.
47/1972  regulating,  inter  alia,  procedures  in  the  administrative  courts  provides  that
« claims will  not be heard » unless raised by somebody who has a « personal interest
(maslaha shakhsiyya) in them. » In the case of challenging an administrative decree in the
administrative courts, however, the Court held that whoever holds a « particular legal
position (hâla qânûniyya khâssa) » has a « personal interesf in the action.
14 This approach is consistent with established principles of Egyptian procedural law. While
in civil and commercial disputes the requirement of « interest in an action » is commonly
understood to require the plaintiff to pursue a personal right, in administrative disputes,
the  scope  of  « interesf  is  defined  in  a  much  wider  sense.  An  action  contesting  an
administrative  act  (qarâr  idârî)  does  not  primarily  serve  the  function  of  enforcing  a
private right,  but is a recours pour excès de pouvoir,  a means to control the legality of
administrative acts ('Abdallah, 1996 : 483-487).
15 In the present case, that the plaintiffs were « Egyptian Muslims » was enough for the
Court to provide them with a legal standing :
Whoever believes in Islam and who holds the opinion that the correct judgement
according to Islamic law regarding female circumcision follows from his belief, in
the sense that this is something commanded by the shari'a, whether considered part
of Islamic tradition (sunan al-Islam) or as a kind of good deed (makrama) for women,
has a personal interest in raising an action.
16 Through this  approach,  the  Court  paved  the  way  to  scrutinize  whether  the  decree
enacted by the Minister of Health was consistent with the « principles of the Islamic
shari'a » mentioned in Article 2 of the Constitution.
 
The principles of the Islamic Shari'a as the major source of
legislation
17 The case under discussion is by far not the only case where a legislative enactment was
challenged on grounds of violating « the principles of the Islamic shari'a » mentioned in
Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution. Provisions of the civil and penal codes as well as
provisions  relating  to  divorce  and  custody  in  the  law of  personal  status  have  been
attacked on these grounds as well. When the constitutional provision was first enacted in
1971, and later amended in 1980, it caused a considerable amount of unrest. By now,
however,  the  Egyptian  Supreme  Constitutional  Court  has  developed  firm  principles
regarding judicial  review based on « the principles of the Islamic shari'a » (cf. Dupret,
1997a ; Bälz, 1997b).
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18 In the present case, the Supreme Administrative Court summarizes these principles as
follows :
The principles of the Islamic shari'a are the major source of legislation (tashri). This
imposes a limitation curtailing both the legislative and executive power, through
which they are obliged, in whatever laws or decrees they enact, to avoid provisions
that may contradict the provisions of Islamic law which are definite in terms of
their immutability and their meaning (al-ahkâm al-shar'iyya al-qat'iyya fi thubûtihâ wa
dalâlatihâ).  Because  these  principles...are  not  accessible  to  ijtihâd,  since  they
represent the general principles and immutable sources of the Islamic shari'a, which
are  not  open to  interpretation and cannot  be  changed...it  is  (consequently)  not
permitted  to  deviate  from  them  or  to  depart  from  their  meaning.  Whatever
legislative enactment contravenes them must be declared null and void.
19 This, however, does not imply that the legislature is bound to a specific interpretation put
forth by the fuqahâ'. In contrast to the immutable, general principles of the Islamic shari'a,
there are rules which are open to interpretation. The Court continues :
The rules subject to interpretation (ahkâm zanniyya) are not stable in terms of their
immutability and their meaning or in both respects. They belong to the realm of
ijtihâd....  Their  application is  flexible and open to change according to time and
clime,  in  order  to  ensure  flexibility  and  dynamism,  when  coping  with  new
developments in their various appearances, when regulating the matters of man
(shu'ûn al-'ibâd)  for  the sake of  protecting their  legally  recognized interests  and
putting the general aims of the shari'a into practice.
20 Consequently,  in  case  there  is  no  « definite »  provision  of  Islamic  law  governing  a
particular  matter,  the  legislature  has  the  right  to  exercise  ijtihâd,  « independent
reasoning ». It has both the duty and privilege to find an interpretation of its own which
is consistent with the requirements of « time and clime ».
21 Regarding the case under examination, the Court discusses female circumcision under
Islamic law at length. Not mentioned in the Koran, this pre-Islamic custom is normally
sanctioned by refering to various hadîth material, including, in particular, the so-called
Exciser's  Narration.  Umm 'Attiyya,  who was  known for  performing  the  operation of
female circumcision, was asked by the Prophet whether she still practiced her profession.
When she  confirmed this,  the  Prophet  replied :  « Cut  slightly  and  do  not  overdo  it,
because it brings more radiance to the face and is more pleasant for the husband. »
22 Other hadîth material invoked in this instance attributes to the Prophet sayings such as :
« Circumcision  (khitân)  conforms  to  the  sunna  (tradition)  for  men  and  is  makram 
(considered  a  good deed)  for  women »  and  « whoever  turns  to  Islam  must  be
circumcised. »
23 However, modern scholars do not agree on the validity and the interpretation of the
hâdith-s. The Court held that « there is no consensus (ijmâ) among the fuqahâ'« regarding
female circumcision and explained : « Many of them (i.e. the fuqahâ) explicitly oppose this
act (arguing that) the valid sunna does not require female circumcision. Whatever hadîth 
material can be invoked in this respect is without exception « weak » (da'îf)....  For this
reason one cannot derive a clear and definite provision or legal  ordinance from this
source. This is the reason why there is disagreement (ikhtilâf) among the four schools of
law (madhâhib) with respect to female circumcision. »
24 As  there  is  no  « definite »  provision  of  Islamic  law  governing  female  circumcision,
regulating this issue is consequently at the legislature's discretion. The legislature must
interpret the « immutable sources and general principles » of Islamic law in the light of
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contemporary social  conditions in order to arrive at a regulation consistent with the
requirements  of  « time  and  clime ».  This,  moreover,  allows  the  Court  to  introduce
principles of international human rights law to its legal argumentation.
 
Female circumcision and the right to bodily integrity
25 The Court begins by defining the scope of bodily integrity (salâmat al-jism), here referring
to  the  concept  of  intégrité  corporelle :  « Legal  protection covers  all  parts  of  the  body,
whether outer or inner. » Moreover, « the human right (haqq al-insân) » to the protection
of  bodily  integrity  requires  the  following :  « to  protect  the  natural  course  of  bodily
functions »,  as well  as « to safeguard all  bodily parts as a whole and not to mutilate
them » and « to avoid physical and psychological pains ». Any intrusion upon the right to
bodily integrity requires a « legitimizing reason » (sabab al-ibâha /cause de justification).
26 Such  a  « legitimizing  reason, »  the  Court  held,  does  not  exist  in  the  case  of  female
circumcision.  Here,  reasoning is  based on arguments derived from both medical  and
penal law.
27 Article 1 of Law no. 415/1954 regulating the medical profession permits all Egyptians who
are duly registered as physicians with the Ministry of Health and the Syndicate of the
medical profession to practice the medical profession and to perform whatever medical
treatment is appropriate. This provision also provides the legal basis for carrying out
surgery.14It does not, however, grant physicians the right to perform the operation of
female  circumcision.  The  Court  held  that  « surgery »  is  only  justified  in  the  case  of
« illness. »  Moreover,  it  has  to  be  carried  out  with  « the  intention to  heal ».  Female
circumcision, in contrast, falls short of both these requirements. Such practice, therefore,
cannot be considered « medical treatment » protected under the law. The Court also held
that the provisions of the Egyptian Penal Code (Law no. 58/1937) do not provide a legal
basis  for  female  circumcision.  The  Penal  Code  deals  in  several  instances  with
« justification on grounds of Islamic law, » providing that exercising a « right based on
the sharî'a » does not constitute a criminal offence.15 Interpretation of these provisions is
rather unclear.  Nevertheless,  the preferred opinion holds that they are not meant to
legalize whatever may be allowed under Islamic law, but were included for historical
reasons and have always been limited in application.16Be this as it may, they cannot be
invoked in order to legalize female circumcision. The Court held :
Female circumcision does not represent a  right to be exercised by anyone over
anyone else, as it is neither a duty (fard) nor an obligation (wâjib) according to its
ruling (hukm) under Islamic law. In contrast, the majority of the medical profession
considers...it  a  detrimental  act  to  women,  inflicting  substantial  damage  which
cannot be permitted except for the sake of medical treatment. And according to
Islamic jurisprudence and law (fiqhan wa shar'an) there is the firm principle : lâ darar
wa lâ dirâr.
28 Là  darar  wa  là  dirâr,  which  translates  roughly  as  « no  damage  and  no  infliction  of
damage, »  is  a  principle  invoked  in  numerous  instances  in  Islamic  law.  Commonly
understood as a general rule « not to inflict harm, » its precise content, however, is hard
to define. In the present context, the Court refers to this principle in order to support the
banning  of  female  circumcision.  The  arguments  once  put  forth  by  the  plaintiffs  are
herewith reversed : the « principles of the Islamic sharî'a, » originally invoked in order to
challenge the ministerial decree, ultimately requires the banning of female circumcision.
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The rule of law and the construction of tradition
29 Research in African law emphasizes that « custom » and « customary law » do not consist
of  ancient,  presupposed rules,  but often were « fabricated » by the modern judiciary.
African customary law, to a large extent, is a historical construct of the colonial period,
which, shaped within the framework of colonial justice, then served as the basis for the
formation of the new national legal systems in the post-colonial period (Snyder, 1981 ;
Chanock, 1985 ; Moore, 1986).
30 This  paradigm,  developed  in  the  African  context,  cannot  be  transferred  without
qualification to the context at  hand.  Nevertheless,  both the « fabrication » of  African
customary  law  and  the  case  under  discussion  share  one  important  feature.  In  both
instances, legal tradition does not provide a body of stable, presupposed rules, but rather
a  point  of  reference or  a  réservoir  (Dupret,  1997b),  upon which « traditional  law »  is
constructed within the framework of the nation-state's modern judiciary.
31 The fact  that  reference to  the Islamic  legal  tradition in contemporary human rights
discourse  is  selective,  and  that  the  body  of  traditional  fiqh  allows  for  different
interpretations, is widely acknowledged in the literature dealing with « Islam and human
rights. »17As the case under discussion exemplifies, however, investigation should not be
limited to various opinions produced within scholarly discourse, but should also focus on
the process through which legal traditions are constructed and defined when put into
practice.
32 In Egypt, this process of constructing legal tradition is closely connected with the rule of
law.  Judicial  review  does  not  only  allow  the  individual  to  challenge  state-enacted
legislation in the courts on the grounds that it contravenes the « principles of the Islamic
sharî'a »  but,  vice  versa,  enables  the  nation-state's  modem judiciary  to  construct  an
officially sanctioned interpretation of the body of Islamic law. Brown emphasizes that the
rule of law in Egypt does not only serve to protect citizen's rights vis-à-vis the state, but
also represents a means of  control,  whose purpose it  is  « to provide support for the
officially  sanctioned  order...,  constructed  as  an  integral  part  of  an  effort  to  build  a
stronger, more effective, more centralized and more intrusive state » (1997 : 237). This
finding also holds true for the context at hand, where the interpretation of « customs »
deemed  « Islamic »  is  defined  through  the  nation-state's  modem  judiciary.  The
constitutional provision elevating « the principles of the Islamic sharî'a » to « the major
source of legislation » does not only allow for judicial review on the basis of Islamic legal
principles — considering the way this constitutional provision is put into practice — but
also  provides  the  nation-state's  judiciary  with  the  authority  to  prescribe  a  « legally
acknowledged » reading of the traditional body of fiqh.
33 As  for  the  question  of  « Islam  and  human  rights »,  the  paradigm  of  « culture »
consequently does not help to explain contemporary developments, as long as « culture »
and « tradition » are considered to belong to a both a timeless and immutable past. As the
case  under  discussion  exemplifies,  « Islamic  traditions »  invoked  in  human  rights
litigation  have  to  be  examined as  a  construct  of  the  modern  judiciary.  Whatever
shortcomings there are, they cannot be simply attributed to the « cultural background »
of  « traditional  sharî'a  law. »  On  the  contrary,  they  are  the  product  of  the  modem
judiciary operating within the rule of law.
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NOTES
1.  E.g. Mayer (1991) ; Dwyer (1991) ;  Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh (1994a) ; Cairo Papers (1994) ;  Müller
(1996).
2.  In particular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant
on Economic,  Social,  and Cultural  Rights  (1966)  and the International  Covenant on Civil  and
Political Rights (1966). For a comprehensive overview of international human rights instruments
see, e.g., Langley (1992).
3.  Cf., e.g., the case law discussed in Bälz (1997a : 148-151).
4. Al-mahkama al-idâriyya al-'ulyâ, Minister of Health v. Shaykh Yûsif al-Badrî et al., Appeal no.
527/43  (28 December  1997).  Quotations  are  taken,  unless  otherwise  indicated,  from  the
aforementioned judgement. On the same day, the Court also rendered another judgement dealing
with the same issue : Prime Minister and Minister of Health v. Muhammad Fawzî al-Haww et al.,
Appeals no. 5204/43 ; 5834/43 ; 6091/43 (28 December 1997).
5. Egyptian Demographic Health Survey (1996) as quoted in Middle East Times, 27 June 1997.
6.  On 17 July 1997, moreover, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemming « the
practice of female genital mutilation of whatever kind. »
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7.  Through  decree  no.  74/1959,  female  circumcision  in  government  hospitals  was  banned
(Article  2).  Moreover,  non-physicians  (including  midwives)  were  prohibited  to  perform  the
operation  (Article  1,3).  The  decree  was  modified  through  a  ministerial  decree  enacted  on
19 October 1994 (al-Saghîr, 1995 : 7-8).
8.  Cf., e.g., Middle East Times, 27 June 1997 (« Judge rules in favor of Islamic lawyers, » 1 ) and
21 November  1997  (« Judges  postpone  circumcision  trial »,  5) ;  Al-Ahrâm  Hebdo,  11 June  1997
(« L'excision envers et contre tout », 5) and 4 February 1998 (« La blessure de la chasteté », 8).
9.  As amended on 22 May 1980.
10.  The Administrative Court discussed female circumcision under Islamic law at some length. In
the end, however, it based its ruling on a rather technical argument. Article 1 law no. 415/1954,
regulating the medical profession, permits « all Egyptians who are duly registered as physicians
with the Ministry of Health and the Syndicate of the Medical Profession to practice as a physician
and to perform surgery. » Physicians, moreover, are entitled « to carry out whatever medical
treatment  falls  into  their  competence »  including  « the  operation  of  male  and  female
circumcision, as this is considered medical treatment. » The privilege of practicing the medical
profession, the Court held, is granted by virtue of a duly promulgated law, and, therefore, can
only be restricted by virtue of a duly promulgated law. It cannot be curtailed, therefore, through
a ministerial decree.
11.  For a detailed discussion cf. Dupret/Ferrié (1997) ; Bälz (1997a).
12.  For a detained discussion cf. Bernard-Maugiron (1997).
13.  Laws no. 3/1996 and 81/1996.
14.  Under Egyptian penal law, surgery is considered a trespass on the person unless the patient
consents  and the physician performs the operation with the intention to  heal  (Husnî,  1982 :
174-175).
15.  The Penal Code contains the following provisions, both invoked by the plaintiffs : Article 7.
The provisions of this law (i.e. the Penal Code) in no respect affect personal rights which are
based on the shari'a. Article 60. The provisions of the penal code are not to be applied to all acts
which are carried out in good faith of exercising a right granted according to the shari'a.
16.  Article 7 of the 1937 Penal Code equals Article 1 of the 1883 Penal Code. The provision was
included in the 1883 Penal Code in order to ease transition to the new, European-style penal
regime. Article 60 equals a provision added to the 1883 Penal Code in 1904, which was included in
order to legalize disciplinary power (Husnî, 1982 :162).
17.  This is stressed, for instance, both by Mayer (1991) and Mûller (1996), even though they draw
fairly disparate conclusions.
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